After mounting the volume, the system and apps once again behave (somewhat*) normally. It has the same attributes as you indicated - Mac OS Ext Journl/Encrypt. Like you, I discovered in Disk Utility that the volume was not (auto)mounted. Both drives are connected to a TB3 dock which in turn, is connected to TB3 port on the Mac mini. ![]() And no issues with my other external USB drive. In my case, a second external USB drive is "gone" from the desktop, gone from Time Machine, etc. Maybe the public cloud needn't be so scary after all.I have the same problem now, immediately after upgrading from 10.14.3 to 10.14.4 (never happened before the upgrade). It's early days yet for hybrid cloud data protection setups, but already multiple companies are making good headway on the ease-of-use side of things. Official support for the individual applications (installed or SaaS-based) is, of course, also required. Solutions that use role-based administration and centralized policies are the ones to look for. More importantly, encryption configurations have to be invisible and something end users don't need to think about. Regardless of what we're trying to secure, securing data in the cloud is all about ease of use. This is how encryption for workloads needs to be done both on-premises and in the cloud if it is to see any real adoption. By jacking into a central KMS and running invisibly on top of the file system using an OS agent, Vormetric's aptly named Transparent Encryption is a great example of encryption that works transparently to the application administrator or developer. Systems administrators aren't all that different. End-user focused encryption technologies like Sookasa see little resistance in day-to-day use because the users don't notice them. Transparent encryptionīeyond making KMS software easy to use, the key to securing data in the cloud is making encryption transparent, both to the end user and the administrator. Vormetric in particular has caught my eye as an example of the sort of interesting things that can be done to secure data both on-premises and off. Proprietary KMSes include IBM's Key Lifecycle Manager (formerly Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager), Thales keyAuthority and Vormetric's Data Security Manager. Major cloud providers offer their own KMS, for example Amazon KMS or Azure Key vault. ![]() Hashicorp Vault and Barbican (Openstack security API) are probably the two best-known options. Linux administrators are probably familiar with a basic example in the form of KeyBox, which manages SSH keys. If you stand up a KMS whose purpose is to store, track and make available encryption keys for your own internal-use applications, it is easier to secure access such that you can trust the KMS and its keys. Key management on a global scale is hard, but it's easier within the scope of a single organization. Applications such as web browsers and components within operating systems have lists of certification authorities they trust. SSL certificates are tied to a certification authority that vouches for their authenticity to varying degrees. In one sense, the entire SSL certificate authority mechanism is key management. It's impossible to do without involving both trust and adherence to some form of standards at some point, limiting the real-world uses of large-scale key management. This isn't because it's difficult to encrypt an email, it's because key management – keeping everyone's keys sorted, verifying keys are still current, belong to the right individual or application, etc – is difficult to organize. You'll note that PGP encryption of email isn't exactly popular. Microsoft has an enterprise licensing management system they call KMS, and the early versions of it were pretty buggy. The undeserved portion comes largely from Microsoft. ![]() Some of the frustrations with KMSes is deserved, and some isn't. This has led to the growing popularity of key management as a service (KMaaS). Key management of public key infrastructure (PKI) is an option for privacy, but key management servers (KMSes) are notoriously miserable to set up and maintain. It has used zero knowledge encryption as the basis for its cloud storage platform. The service is designed so that Sync (the company) couldn't crack open your Sync account and root around inside, even if they wanted to. Another option is Canadian Dropbox alternative.
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